Eval is evil, part two

As I promised, more information on why eval is evil. (We once considered having T-shirts printed up that said “Eval is evil!” on one side and “Script happens!” on the other, but the PM’s never managed to tear themselves away from their web browsing long enough to order them.)

Incidentally, a buddy of mine who is one of those senior web developer kinda guys back in Waterloo sent me an email yesterday saying “Hello, my name is Robert and I am an evalaholic”. People, it wasn’t my intention to start a twelve step program, but hey, whatever works!

As I discussed the other day, eval on the client is evil because it leads to sloppy, hard-to-debug-and-maintain programs that consume huge amounts of memory and run unnecessarily slowly even when performing simple tasks. But like I said in my performance rant, if it’s good enough, then hey, it’s good enough.  Maybe you don’t need to write maintainable, efficient code. Seriously! Script is often used to write programs that are used a couple of times and then thrown away, so who cares if they’re slow and inelegant?

But eval on the server is an entirely different beast. First off, server scenarios are generally a lot more performance sensitive than client scenarios.  On a client, once your code runs faster than a human being can notice the lag, there’s usually not much point in making it faster.  But  as I mentioned earlier, ASP goes to a lot of work to ensure that for a given page, the compiler only runs once. An eval defeats this optimization by making the compiler run every time the page runs! On a server, going from 25 ms to 40 ms to serve a page means going from 40 pages a second to 25 pages a second, and that can be expensive in real dollar terms.

But that’s not the most important reason to eschew eval on the server.  Any use of eval (or its VBScript cousins Eval, Execute and ExecuteGlobal) is a potentially enormous security hole:

<%
  var Processor_ProductList;
  var Software_ProductList;
  var HardDisk_ProductList;
  // ...
  CategoryName = Request.QueryString("category");
  ProductList = eval(CategoryName & "_ProductList");
  // ...

What’s wrong with this picture?  The server assumes that the client is not hostile.  Is that a warranted assumption?  Probably not!  You know nothing about the client that sent the request.  Maybe your client page only sends strings like “Processor” and “HardDisk” to the server, but anyone can write their own web page that sends

((new ActiveXObject('Scripting.FileSystemObject')).
DeleteFile('C:*.*',true)); 
Processor

which will cause eval to evaluate

((new ActiveXObject('Scripting.FileSystemObject')).
DeleteFile('C:*.*',true)); 
Processor_ProductList

Obviously that’s a pretty unsophisticated attack.  The attacker can put any code in there that they want, and it will run in the context of the server process.  Hopefully the server process is not a highly privileged one, but still, there’s vast potential for massive harm here just by screwing up the logic on your server.

Never trust the input to a server, and try to never use eval on a server.  Eval injection makes SQL injection look tame!

To try and mitigate these sorts of problems, JScript .NET has some restrictions on its implementation of eval, but that’s a topic for another entry.


Notes from 2020

The attack I’m briefly describing here is of course only one of a great many “hostile client gets bad string onto the server” attack patterns. During my time at Coverity I got to take a deep look at the tools which attempt to detect code paths where a string goes from an untrusted source to a dangerous sink. In terms of the complexity of the analyzed control flows, these were probably the most sophisticated checkers we had, and among the most prone to false positives.

Defeating injection attacks is a hard problem, and I wish we at Microsoft had solved it in the type system, rather than creating a market for expensive third-party solutions that use symbolic execution to effectively do the work of imposing a type system post hoc on an existing program.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s